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Kłamstwa o Lockerbie Lockerbie Lies Published on Jun 2, 2011 Libyan War the Truth

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Full transcript of judgment: http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/lockerbie/docs/lockerbiejudgement.pdf

Analysis of judgment: http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/libya/lockerbie-perverse-verdict.htm

Website of one of the victim's father: http://www.lockerbietruth.com/

Full documentary: The New Libya Oct 2003 Produced by SBS/Dateline Distributed by Journeyman Pictures. After years of isolation from the international community it looks as though Libya is on the road to reform.

The trial of the "Lockerbie bomber" was worse than a travesty of justice: Evidence that never came to court proves his innocence

Allan Francovich: The Maltese Double-Cross - Lockerbie (1994) Discusses evidence and witnesses that would eventually figure at the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing trial in 2000:

• the Mebo MST — 13 timer fragment, which Thomas Thurman of the FBI's forensic laboratory said that he identified on June 15, 1990;

• Mebo's Swiss owner, Edwin Bollier, is interviewed at length;

• forensic scientist, Dr Michael Scott, describes DERA's 'forensic expert', Alan Feraday, as a technician without any formal qualifications as a scientist;

• solicitor, Alastair Logan, criticises DERA's Dr Thomas Hayes for the forensic evidence that was used to convict the Maguire Seven;

• former CIA operative, Oswald LeWinter says the appointment of 'Libyan dirty tricks expert', Vincent Cannistraro, to head the CIA's team investigating Lockerbie 'would be funny, if it were not an obscenity';

• Department of Defense Whistle Blower Lester Coleman linked the bomb to a terrorist cell trained by CIA operative, Edwin P. Wilson; and,

• best-selling author, David Yallop, reviews the available evidence and looks at who might have been responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.

The documentary disputes the conclusion reached by the official investigation into the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, instead advancing the theory that the bomb was introduced onto the aircraft by an unwitting drug mule, Khaled Jafaar, in what the filmmaker claims is a CIA-protected suitcase.

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, former prime minister of Iran, discusses the idea that Iran took revenge for the shootdown by the USS Vincennes of Iran Air Flight 655 in July 1988.

Lockerbie - The Syrian Connection Document Provenance An article by David Guyatt

Originally published on his "Deep Black Lies" web site in 1997 and reproduced here with permission. Copyright David Guyatt

Wikispooks note

This article was written and published well before the extradition and trial of the Libyan Suspects and the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi in 2001, which makes its prediction about the hounding of the Libyans rather impressive.

See Also: Lockerbie Bombing


The narcotics trafficking, gun-running and money-laundering cover-up of Pan Am flight 103

“I think the CIA and Justice Department are withholding the truth.” Winding down his March 14, 1996, speech in the House of Representatives, Congressman James Traficant, was referring to a joint British-US cover-up over the Lockerbie bombing. Permitted precisely sixty seconds to make his point, the straight-talking Republican went straight for the jugular.

Traficant has long disbelieved the US and British claim that Libya was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Telling his fellow Congressman that “intelligence experts around the world disagree,” with the British and US position, he continued “I think Congress deserves the truth. I think the families of the victims of 103 deserve the truth.” Going unsaid was Traficant’s belief that Pan Am 103 was bombed with the fore-knowledge and acquiescence of the CIA.

Two months earlier in January 1996, Prime Minister Major came under similar pressure to come clean. Cross party members of Parliament pressed the government to agree to prosecute the two Libyan “suspects” at an international tribunal in the Hague. The accused, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, believe that a trial on British soil would be prejudiced.

John Major swatted-away the Parliamentary suggestion with shoddy arguments and stone-walling tactics. Many were left to conclude he fears any sort of independent trial. Such an event may once and for all reveal the murky trans-Atlantic cover-up that has dogged this story for eight years.

The threads of suspicion that surround the Lockerbie atrocity are many and complex. Labour MP, Tam Dalyell, told me that he first became involved on New year’s eve in 1988. A police sergeant friend had been drafted-in to search the crash site. The policeman phoned the MP asking “how come all the evidence is being tampered with?”

Dalyell, known as a terrier who’s bite is a lot worse than his bark, has pursued the story ever since. He is accompanied by Conservative MP, Sir Teddy Taylor, who also has a reputation for not letting go once he has sunk his teeth in. During an interview the Southend East MP said he had been in contact with the source who had provided the “timing switches” for the Lockerbie bomb. The source said he would be able to identify whether the timing switch used on Pan Am 103 was part of a consignment sent to Libya, or whether it formed part of a larger batch delivered to East Germany. In a reply to the MP, the Lord Advocate refused access for purposes of identification.


Interfor Inc., a private investigation firm, was hired by TWA to examine the suspicious circumstances behind the downing of flight 103. Their confidential investigation unearthed Sryian drug-baron, Monzer Al-Khassar’s involvement in the affair, and also revealed Al-Khassar’s relationship with Major General Richard Secord - one of the principals in Oliver North’s Iran-Contra activities. The British media, in particular, The Observer, trashed the report as nonsense and fantasy. This resulted in a fiery riposte from Congressman Traficant, who accused the Observer team of working for the CIA, saying: “You’ve come here a day late, a dime short and you’re a piece of shit.”

Within hours of Pan Am 103 exploding over the small Scottish village, CIA agents were swarming over the wreckage. Clearly they were looking for something extraordinary. Aboard the downed plane was a secret, five-man Defence Intelligence Agency “team” headed by Major Charles “Tiny” McKee. A suitcase belonging to McKee was recovered and emptied before being returned to the site to be “found” again. Inside had been a large quantity of Heroin, some “sensitive” documents, plus a large quantity of cash and travellers cheques. These items were “purged” from official records. Incredibly, an unidentified body was also removed from the crash site. No official explanation has been given for these extraordinary examples of evidence tampering.

The DIA team had been in Lebanon searching for US hostages held by Hezbollah. Whilst in Lebanon, McKee’s team is said to have come across a secret CIA operation known as “CIA One,” who were collaborating with Manzur El-Khassar, a Syrian drug dealer. El-Khassar was closely aligned to Lt. Col. Oliver North’s highly illegal activities around the world. These included covert trafficking of narcotics and weapons. The Syrian was also involved in brokering weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages. El-Khassar’s precise role in the Lockerbie bombing may be the missing link that unravels the entire story.

In recent weeks it has been revealed that the Contra’s, backed by Oliver North’s covert group, were responsible for the explosion of Crack Cocaine in Los Angeles, and thence into mainland America. Gary Webb, an investigative journalist for the San Jose Mercury News, shattered American readers with his “The Dark Alliance” series. Following a year of investigations, the journalist revealed that the Contra’s shipped vast quantities of Cocaine to the US to finance much need weapon purchases for their war in Nicaragua. This was done with the tacit backing of the CIA, Webb suggested.

Webb’s astonishing revelations strike at the very heart of the secret CIA Iran-Contra story. By 1984, the Senate had vetoed the provision of additional funds for the covert Nicaraguan campaign. Blocked at home, North - under the crafty guidance of Bill Casey, Director of Central Intelligence - looked for alternative ways to raise the necessary finance. The answer was narcotics trafficking.


Former Director (DCI) of the Central Intelligence Agency, William (Bill) Casey was obsessed with Libya’s Iraq. Casey increasingly tasked the CIA with obtaining ever more detailed information on Qaddafi and his activities. This obsession grew to the point where, at times, Libya became a more important target than the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s vitriolic view of Qaddafi was shaped by a CIA report that warned he had been personally targeted for assassination by a Libyan hit-squad. This led to a Top Secret message to Qaddafi threatening massive retaliation. A State Department analysis suggested the CIA report was “later discounted,” as CIA disinformation.

Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley is a fertile area ideally suited to growing Opium. Rifat Assad, the brother of Syria’s President Hafez Assad is widely known to have been in charge of Syria’s narcotics enterprise, and was the “Supremo” of the Bekaa Valley’s massive Opium industry. Rifat, a CIA “asset,” was being groomed to succeed his elder brother to become the Syrian President. He was extremely close to El-Khassar. The influx of 30,000 Syrian troops to Lebanon in the late eighties, had as much to do with protecting the Opium fields, as with separating the warring factions.

El-Khassar, in exchange for his help to release US hostages held in Lebanon, and, presumably, for past favours to the Contra’s, was permitted to ship Heroin to the US. The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) maintain that his pipeline, through Frankfurt airport, was a carefully controlled “sting” operation. Others, more cynical doubt this explanation.

Dark rumours persist that Major “Tiny” McKee had unearthed the illegal dope connection and realised that elements within the CIA were actively collaborating in it. Deciding to report the matter to his superiors, McKee booked his team on a flight home aboard the ill fated Pan Am 103. Their travel plans were intercepted and reported to Syrian intelligence, who notified El-Khassar. He, in turn, arranged to have a bomb planted inside the suitcase used to carry the regular Heroin shipment - to dispose of McKee and his evidence.

It is at this point that an alternative scenario arises. The July 1988 shoot-down of an Iranian Airbus by the US Navy battle cruiser, Vincennes, resulted in the deaths of 290 passengers. Despite US statements that this was a tragic accident, disbelieving hard-line Ayatollahs were hell-bent on revenge. They hired the Syrian based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command (PFLP-GC) for a tit-for-tat attack. Under the leadership of Ahmed Jabril, an expert on blowing up airplanes, plans were speedily put in place. Jibril learned of El-Khassar’s CIA protected Frankfurt dope pipeline and persuaded El-Khassar to substitute a bomb inside the normal Heroin laden suitcase. The subsequent deaths of Tiny McKee and his team were co-incidental.

However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that both these scenarios merge rather than diverge. Faced with exposure of his drugs pipeline, and aware that the Iranians had planned a spectacular revenge for the Airbus attack, El-Khassar and his CIA-Syrian “minders” may have cobbled together a plan that killed two birds with one stone. They would aid the Syrian based Jibril to satisfy the Ayatollahs lust for revenge, and at the same time rid themselves of US intelligence agents who were about to blow the whistle on their top secret drug and weapons trafficking arrangements.


The 21 December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 resulted in the deaths of all 259 passengers and crew. Eleven more fatalities in Lockerbie resulted from wreckage of the Boeing 747 Jumbo jet raining down on unsuspecting villagers. News of the atrocity blazed across the headlines around the world. This prompted an immediate cover-up, which has remained to this day.

The US-British line remains that the two Libyan “suspects” - Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah - must be turned over to British authorities for trial. Central to the official case is the timer-switch hidden in a Toshiba radio used to blow-up flight 103. Despite this, Britain will not allow scrutiny of the switch remnants. It is also alleged that the suspects placed the radio in a suitcase flown from Malta to Frankfurt, and transferred to the Pan Am flight. Maltese authorities reject this, saying the allegations are “unsupported by any concrete evidence.” Is British and American legal intransigence designed to “mothball” the truth in perpetuity? Many experts believe the answer is a definite yes.

The centre-piece of this strategy was to blame Libya. Col. Muammar Qaddafi was widely seen as an eccentric leader. His past financing of terrorists organisations, including the IRA, caused understandable friction. Sitting atop a wealthy and independent oil based economy, Qaddafi refused to fully align himself with either the western alliance led by the US, or the Easter Bloc under the leadership of the former USSR.

Inside the US Administration, one figure had a personal detestation of Libya’s erstwhile leader. During the course of his tenor as Director of the CIA, Bill Casey was pre-occupied with finding new ways to bring Qaddafi down. Constantly pressing his viewpoint home, Casey eventually gained the support of senior Cabinet members, George Schultz, Caspar Weinburger and others to undertake military and covert operations, designed to topple Qaddafi.

These included projects with “Flower” code-names. “Tulip” was a CIA covert operation that sought to mobilise the anti-Qaddafi exile movements, leading, hopefully, to a Coup D’Etat. “Rose” involved a pre-emptive strike against Libya with the support of US allies, notably Egypt.

Another operation code-named “Prairie Fire” resulted in a three carrier battle-group steaming just off the Libyan coast. The US armada included forty five warships and 200 warplanes. Beneath the waves slid the latest nuclear-powered attack submarines. This was a meticulously planned provocation designed to draw Libyan forces into an attack. The planned response was graduated and included warplanes striking deep into Libyan territory to bomb oil-pumping facilities and other economic targets. The “boys- own” discussion on “Prairie Fire” reached its zenith when Don Regan, White House Chief of Staff, asked if nuclear weapons were to be used. They were not, he was told. Despite this, US threats to use nuclear weapons against Libya were renewed in spring 1996.

Lester Coleman, former Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) operative, had first-hand knowledge of the covert events surrounding Lockerbie. His book “Trail of the Octopus” jointly written with Donald Goddard, blew the lid off the Lockerbie story and laid bare the Frankfurt airport narcotics pipeline.

With death threats ringing in his ears, Coleman fled with his family to Sweden, and was granted political asylum. Interviewed by phone, Coleman explained the US rationale in falsely blaming Libya. They’re an “easy hit,” he said. Scapegoating Libya has become a political art form in US domestic politics. Mimicking a drawling mid-west voice, Coleman expounded further. The strategy plays to the “Rednecks,” he said, who believe anything they’re told about “Ay-rabs.” “It’s all domestic politics,” he concluded.

How Megrahi and Libya were framed for Lockerbie

Document Provenance An article by Alexander Cockburn Published in The First Post 22 July 2010.

Amid all the fuss about Megrahi’s early release, there remains strong evidence he didn’t do it

Amid all the bellowing about the release on compassionate grounds of Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, convicted of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 in 1988, all current commentary ignores the hippo in the room - which is the powerful evidence that Megrahi was innocent, framed by the US and British security services and originally found guilty because Scottish judges had their arms brutally twisted by Westminster. The conviction was one of the great judicial scandals of the 20th Century.

The original Lockerbie trial took place in 2000, in Zeist, Holland. It was presided over by three Scottish judges who travelled to the Netherlands courthouse, convicting Megrahi and acquitting his colleague, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.

In a trenchant early criticism of the verdict, Hans Koechler, a distinguished Austrian philosopher appointed as one of five international observers at the trial by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, issued a well-merited denunciation of the judges' bizarre conclusion.

"In my opinion," Koechler said, "there seemed to be considerable political influence on the judges and the verdict." Koechler queried the active involvement of senior US Justice Department officials as part of the Scotch prosecution team "in a supervisory role".

In essence, the case was based (a) on the presumption that the bomb timer on the PanAm plane was from a batch sold by a Swiss firm to Libya; (b) that fragments of clothing retrieved from the crash site and identified as having been in the suitcase that contained the bomb had been bought by the accused Megrahi from a shop in Malta; and (c) that a "secret witness," Abdulmajid Gialka, a former colleague of the accused pair in the Libyan Airlines office in Malta, would testify that he had observed them either constructing the bomb or at least seen them loading it onto the plane in Frankfurt.

The prosecution was unable to produce evidence to substantiate any of these points or to encourage any confidence in Gialka's reliability as a witness. The Swiss manufacturer of the timer, Edwin Bollier, testified that he had sold timers of a similar type to the East Germans and conceded, under cross-examination by defence lawyers, that he had connections to many intelligence agencies, including not only the Libyans but also the CIA.

By the time of the trial, Gialka had been living under witness protection in the US. He had received $320,000 from his American hosts and, in the event of conviction of the accused, stood to collect up to $4 million in reward money. He had CIA connections, so the defence lawyers learned, before 1988.

The prosecution's case absolutely depended on proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Megrahi was the man who bought the clothes, traced by police to a Maltese clothes shop. In 19 separate statements to police prior to the trial, the shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, had failed to make a positive identification of Megrahi.

In the witness box, Gauci was asked five times if he recognised anyone in the courtroom. No answer. Finally, the exasperated prosecutor pointed to the dock and asked if the man sitting on the left was the customer in question. The best Gauci could do was mumble that "he resembles him".

Gauci had also told the police that the man who bought the clothes was 6ft tall and over 50 years of age. Megrahi is

5ft 8in tall, and in late 1988 he was 36. The clothes were bought either on November 23 or December 7, 1988. On an earlier occasion, when shown a photograph of Mohammed Abu Talb, a Palestinian terrorist whom the defence contended was the real bomber, Gauci used almost the same words with more confidence, declaring, according to his brother, that Talb "resembles" the clothes buyer "a lot".

Gauci's identification of Megrahi at the identity parade just before the opening of the trial was with the words, "Not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look [sic] a little bit like is the number 5 [Megrahi]".

Megrahi was in Malta on December 7 but not on the November date. The shopkeeper recalled that the man who bought the clothes also bought an umbrella because it was raining heavily outside. Maltese meteorological records introduced by the defence showed clearly that while it did rain all day on November 23, there was almost certainly no rain on December 7. If it did rain on that date, the shower would have been barely enough to wet the pavement. Nevertheless, the judges held it proven that Megrahi had bought the clothes on December 7.

No less vital to the prosecution's case was its contention that the bomb that destroyed PanAm flight 103 had been loaded as unaccompanied baggage onto an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, flown on to London, and thence onto the ill-fated flight to New York. In support of this, prosecutors produced a document from Frankfurt airport indicating that a bag had gone from the baggage-handling station, at which the Air Malta bags (along with those from other flights) had been unloaded, and had been sent to the handling station for the relevant flight to London.

But there was firm evidence from the defence that all the bags on the Air Malta flight were accompanied and were collected at the other end. Nevertheless, the judges held it proven that the lethal suitcase had indeed come from Malta. When Granada TV broadcast a documentary asserting such a transfer as a fact, Air Malta sued and extracted damages.

The most likely explanation of the judges' decision to convict Megrahi despite the evidence, or lack of it, must be that either they panicked at the thought of the uproar that would ensue at the US end if they let both the Libyans off, or they were simply given their marching orders by high authority in London. English judges are used to doing their duty in this manner.

Back in 2000 a former CIA official told my brother, Andrew Cockburn, who undertook an investigation of the case for our newsletter CounterPunch – the factual substrate of these observations - that he had taken part in the original investigation of the PanAm bombing. He said that if the original CIA report was ever to be made public, it would provide "damning evidence" that "the Libyans were never directly involved in the Lockerbie bombing." In fact, the evidence in the CIA's possession pointed more clearly in the direction of the original suspects in the case, members of a group known as the PFLP-GC, closely linked to Iran.

The Iranians had a clear motive for an attack on an American airliner, following the destruction of an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf carrying 290 passengers, including 66 children, on July 3, 1988.

The initial US and British investigations pointed clearly to a case against the Iranians as having contracted with the Lebanon-based PFLP-GC, or a section thereof, to exact retribution.

Two months before Lockerbie, the West Germans arrested members of this group outside Dusseldorf as they were preparing bombs specifically designed to bring down airliners. US intelligence had traced a payment of $500,000 into the account of a professional bomber, Abu Talb, in April 1989.

A British journalist showed the Maltese shop owner who sold the clothes found in the PanAm bomb-suitcase a photo of Talb, and he declared that the man in the photo "most resembled" the purchaser. At one point, the Scottish police were about to charge Talb who had, since 1989, been serving time in a Swedish jail for a series of bomb attacks in Sweden and Denmark.

In March 1989, however, Margaret Thatcher called President GWH Bush to discuss the case. The two leaders agreed it was important to "cool it" on the Iranian angle, since they were in no position to punish the Tehran regime, which had just survived the eight-year war with US/UK-sponsored Iraq.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, it became more imperative than ever to obscure any suspicion of Iranian complicity in the Lockerbie bombing, given the importance of Iranian assistance in the upcoming war with Saddam Hussein. Thus the perennial "rogue," Col Muammar Gadaffi, was drafted as the suspect of choice, with Megrahi as his instrument.

The irony is that today the US would no doubt be only too eager to finger Iran as the true perpetrator.

References ↑ First Post article original - 22 July 2010

The Lockerbie case and the corruption of justice

Document Provenance The Lockerbie case and the corruption of justice or: justice delayed is justice denied

Comment article written by Dr. Hans Köchler, UN appointed international observer at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands, upon invitation of the Scottish Sunday Express. [1]

Vienna, Sunday, 9 August 2009

Back in August 1998 the United Nations Security Council had “welcomed” the resolution of the legal-political dispute between Libya and the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom over the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie through the trial of two Libyan suspects before an extraterritorial Scottish Court in the Netherlands. While the dispute between the governments has been settled years ago and Libya now entertains businesslike relations with both the US and UK, the only individual convicted in the Lockerbie case, the Libyan Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi, still awaits a final verdict in his case, the announcement of which he may not live to see because, while in Scottish custody, he has fallen ill with cancer that was detected only at a time when, so the prison authorities say, it was already too late to administer more than palliative care.

The hopeless, indeed Kafkaesque, situation which the lone Libyan prisoner finds himself in is further aggravated by the fact that his second appeal has suffered from enormous delays – which are scandalous under any circumstances and, seen in the context of deliberate withholding of evidence, are tantamount to an obstruction of justice. His predicament became even more serious when certain quarters confronted him with the alternative of either giving up his appeal in order to be sent back to Libya on the basis of a recently ratified “prisoner exchange agreement” between the UK and Libya – or die in a Scottish jail.

Under these circumstances, Scotland’s Cabinet Secretary for Justice (who certainly has seen the latest medical reports) should act without further delay on Mr. al Megrahi’s second request (the first was rejected) for “compassionate release” under the provisions of Scots law. This would allow the appeal to continue and avoid the circumstances of “emotional blackmail” the Lockerbie prisoner faces in regard to the prisoner exchange option. Apart from the convicted Libyan national’s right – under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – to a proper judicial review, it is in the supreme public interest of Scotland and the United Kingdom that this second appeal proceed unhindered and that, eventually, a decision be reached beyond a reasonable doubt. This fundamental criterion of Scots law was not in any way met by the trial verdict and (first) appeal decision of the Scottish Court sitting in the Netherlands back in 2001 and 2002. The Opinions of the Court issued by the two panels of Scottish judges were inconsistent and based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence; on testimony of at least two key witnesses who had received huge amounts of money; on the opinions of forensic experts of, to say the least, dubious reputation and with problematic links to intelligence services; and on at least one piece of evidence that had been inserted at a later stage into the list of documents and apparently been tampered with. Furthermore, vital evidence such as that of a break-in at a luggage storage area at Heathrow airport in the night before the departure of the doomed flight had been withheld from the court during the first trial (a fact that still has not been properly explained), and further vital evidence is still being withheld in the phase of the second appeal due to the British Foreign Secretary’s having issued a so-called Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate. Concerns similar to those which I had raised in my reports to the United Nations Organization in 2001 and 2002 about improprieties, irregularities and judicial malpractices have also been raised by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) that, in June 2007, referred Mr. al Megrahi’s case back to the appeal court, suspecting – as I had done on the day of the original verdict on 31 January 2001 – that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Regrettably, the SCCRC has decided to keep some of the reasons for its decision secret.

The public is also kept in the dark about what Scotland’s Justice Secretary discussed at his meeting with Mr. al Megrahi at Greenock prison, which was indeed an unprecedented step in Scottish legal history. One thing should be taken for certain, however: If Mr. MacAskill is a man of honour, he will not have made granting the prisoner’s request for “compassionate release” conditional upon the latter’s dropping the ongoing appeal. This would not only be morally outrageous, it would also be illegal in terms of Scots law and, as infringement upon a convicted person’s freedom to seek judicial review, in outright violation of the European Human Rights Convention the provisions of which are binding upon Scotland.

If Scotland prides itself in its unique judicial system, which it has practiced since long before devolution, the authorities should exercise all efforts to repair the damage that has been done to the country’s reputation by the flawed judicial proceedings in the case of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi. If Mr. MacAskill is indeed serious about dealing with the matter strictly within legal parameters, as he repeatedly said, the competent Scottish authorities should finally make those steps that are necessary to identify the actual “Lockerbie bombers” (in the plural!) wherever they may be and however powerful they still may be, apparently having succeeded for so long in using the Scottish judicial system to make Mr. al Megrahi a scapegoat in the strange and ugly world of international power politics.

References ↑ [1] http://www.i-p-o.org/IPO-nr-Lockerbie_case-10Aug09.htm Original article - IPO Vienna

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